## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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#### CHINESE MODERATES PRESS FOR END OF CIVIL WAR

A LTHOUGH political maneuvering in China has been stimulated by General Marshall's report of January 7, all signs indicate that a negotiated settlement of the civil war is more remote than ever. The Central government, with American Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart acting as intermediary, took the formal action of making a new peace offer to the Chinese Communists on January 16. Two days later the Communists' rejection of the terms was announced. The core of the government plan was the proposal of a truce based on existing military positions, an arrangement which would require the Communists to write off all the territory lost to the Central armies since the breakdown of last year's agreements. The main point of the Communist reply was that new agreements could not be more effective than previous ones unless the government disavowed the constitution, which was recently adopted without the Communists, and agreed to restore the military positions of January 13, 1946 when enforcement of a cease-fire order began.

THE DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE. One significant feature of the current situation, in view of General Marshall's emphasis on the importance of backing the Chinese liberals, is the steadfastness with which the Democratic League, the chief liberal group, has adhered to its criticisms of the Central government and of American policy. In an interview in Shanghai on January 20 Professor Lo Lung-chi, an Americaneducated leader of the League, denied that the Communist terms for peace talks made discussions impossible. He expressed the view that reorganization of the Central government without the Communists would prolong the civil war and declared that the failure of General Marshall's mission resulted from the "wrong policy" of the United States. Two weeks before, on January 5, Lo had proposed that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek make concessions to the Communists on the question of restoring the military status quo of January 13, 1946.

For some months the Nanking authorities, perhaps mainly with an eye to American public opinion and United States aid, have been clearing the ground for a government "reorganization" which would bring some non-Kuomintang elements into the Administration, but not involve coalition with the Communists. The task has not been easy in view of the League's unwillingness to settle for anything less than an all-party regime based on last year's peace agreements. It is true that for a year or more the Young China party, which once formed the extreme right wing of the League but later seceded, has been working with the Kuomintang on most issues. But this relationship has discredited the Young China party as an independent group, and its entrance into the government would carry little weight.

At least since the spring of 1946 the Kuomintang has been wooing another conservative League group, namely the State Socialist party, later renamed the Democratic Socialist party. The government's efforts proved successful when the Democratic Socialist party joined in the recent constitutional assembly, which was boycotted by the League, and subsequently withdrew from the League. But the victory is of limited value to the Kuomintang, since only a very small portion of the League's membership is involved. Moreover, the Democratic Socialists are not prepared to join the administration now.

The government has hoped that the constitution adopted last December would facilitate its plans for reorganization. But the new document, although welcomed in some sections of the American press, has not made a particularly striking impression in China, where the dark realities of civil war and the daily

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struggle for existence overshadow verbal pledges. The country's best-known newspaper, the Shanghai Ta Kung Pao, complained on January 4 that application of the chapter on civil liberties has been deferred, even though the constitution as a whole had been promulgated officially at the beginning of the new year. Moreover, Chinese political circles are aware that the constitution contains important limitations on the civil liberties it grants. According to Article 23, citizens' rights may not be restricted "except as warranted by reason of preventing infringement of the liberties of other persons, averting an imminent crisis, maintaining social order or advancing public interest." These qualifications are broad enough to permit any limitation of civil rights the government may consider necessary, especially since China will be in a state of "imminent crisis" involving "social order" and the "public interest" as long as civil war continues.

CIVIL WAR MAIN ISSUE. Criticism of the Central government appears to be growing in China. Far from being weakened by the defection of the Democratic Socialist party, the Democratic League, which held its second national congress in Shanghai this month, seems on the way toward becoming a more tight-knit organization. The bitter student demonstrations which were touched off in late December and early January by the charge of a Chinese girl student that an American marine had attacked her, were directed not only at American policy, but also at the Central government. While the movement was in

process, it spread to over a dozen cities, marking an upsurge of left-wing and liberal student political activity not seen in government territory in many years.

The outstanding fact of the current Chinese situation is that "liberalizing" action by the government, whether in the form of a new constitution or a reshuffled administration, can be little more than a political maneuver as long as the civil war continues. This is widely recognized in China today. On January 26, for example, a conference of eighty independent business, financial and professional leaders issued a manifesto in Shanghai, appealing for peace on this ground: "If hostilities' do not stop, the date of the total collapse of China will not be far off."

The Chinese situation is of importance to the United States as well as the Chinese government, for rising anti-civil war sentiment in Central government territory will mean rising criticism of American policy. The United States has already lost much Chinese goodwill because of its material support of a Central government engaged in civil conflict. It is true that our current aid is at a rather low level, but our total assistance since V-J day has been substantial, and the expectation of future assistance plays a large part in Nanking's calculations. Few issues facing the United States in world affairs are more important than the need to reconsider our China policy with a view to restoring traditional goodwill between China and the United States.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

### POLAND'S ECONOMY REVIVES DESPITE POLITICAL CONFLICTS

The Polish elections of January 19, the first since 1935, resulted in an even more sweeping victory than had been anticipated for the government bloc, which was reported to have won 11,000,000 votes as compared with approximately 1,500,000 votes for the Peasant party headed by former Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the only one of six political parties which was in the opposition. The following day the 383 seats in parliament gained by the government bloc were assigned to component and supporting parties on the basis of 119 respectively to the Communists and Socialists, 106 to the bloc-supported dissident Peasant group, 38 to the Democratic party, and one Independent. According to government spokesmen, the Peasant party received only 10 per cent of the votes, but Mikolajczyk contended that his party would have had 60 or 70 per cent in an honest count of election returns.

ELECTIONS NOT "FREE AND UNFET-TERED." The conclusion reached by the embassies of the United States and Britain in Warsaw as well as by correspondents of Western newspapers (whose reports were uncensored) is that the January 19 poll did not constitute the "free and unfettered elections" which the Polish government had

pledged itself to hold under the Potsdam agreement of July 1945. Peasant party candidates were excluded from voting lists, the party's newspapers were censored or suppressed, individual Peasant party leaders were molested, threatened, and in some instances killed, in many voting districts the party was not permitted to participate in the counting of votes, and voters were encouraged to use open instead of secret ballots. The government, headed by Boleslaw Beirut, a veteran member of the Polish Communist party who had spent considerable time in Moscow, made no secret of its hostility toward Mikolajczyk whom it regards as too closely linked to Polish exiles abroad, or of its reluctance to hold the elections at the present time. It was only because of insistent urging by London and Washington that the elections were held at all. Government leaders had argued that continued civil strife, for which they blame the underground, and the unsettled international situation created conditions unfavorable to free elections.

A HIGHLY COMPLEX SITUATION. Discussions of Poland in the United States have been so overshadowed by controversies over the elections that the complex and contradictory factors at stake

have been relatively neglected by the Western press. Poland suffered greater physical destruction at the hands of the Germans than any one of the other United Nations with the possible exception of Russia, yet it is showing signs of more rapid and more solid recovery than most of its neighbors. Many Westerners have thought of Poland as an appendage of Russia, yet the proud individualism of the Poles, comparable only to that of the Spanish, and their centuries-old hatred of Russia, which is not confined to any one political group or class of the population, make it difficult in practice for Poland to become a mere carbon copy of Russian ideas and practices. Some Polish liberals, while resenting the restrictions imposed by the Communist-dominated government, feared that genuinely "free and unfettered elections" might bring back to power those elements in Poland which sympathized with the ideas of Fascism even if they did not actually collaborate with the Germans. The majority of Poles are fervent Roman Catholics and, in spite of tension between the government and the Vatican, government leaders have sought to reassure the Church about its freedom to function and its property rights, while the church hierarchy avoided open denunciation of the government bloc during the pre-election conflicts. The security police which, in the opinion of both Poles and foreigners, has threatened to transform Poland into a totalitarian state but, according to the government, has been needed to combat guerrilla activities of the underground, is repugnant to a people imbued with a tradition of passionate attachment to personal liberty. It is significant that one of the first actions of the government following the elections was to announce that the Ministry of Public Security, which has charge of the security police, will soon be abolished.

REVIVAL OF POLAND. Meanwhile, by a paradox that strikes all foreign visitors to Poland, political conflict bordering on chaos has not prevented an extraordinary economic revival which, should future conditions prove favorable, promises to make Poland, with a population of 45,000,000, one of the leading nations in Europe. This revival has been due

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in part to vigorous measures taken by the Communists and Socialists who number in their ranks some of the best technicians in the country, but most of all to the amazing vitality of a hard-working and inherently optimistic people who have resumed their tasks without waiting for long-range government plans. Poland has rich coal resources of its own, to which have been added the German Silesian coal mines, and thus has a base for modern industrial development as well as a source of valuable exports. In a period when Britain and the Ruhr suffer from various coal-mining difficulties, the Poles plan to export 20,000,000 tons of coal a year, which would bring in about two-thirds of the \$300,000,000 they must raise by exports. The imports Poland needs most urgently are foodstuffs, for which it expects to have to spend \$132,000,000 now that the work of UNRRA is nearing its end. Eventually the Poles hope to obtain additional food from the farmlands of eastern Germany where 4,000,000 Polish citizens have already settled, following the ejection of the area's German inhabitants. This farming area, however, was assigned to Poland at Potsdam "pending final delimitation" of Poland's western border-and the reported intention of the United States to propose reconsideration of this border at the Moscow conference has aroused alarm and resentment.

Poland is not, and because of its historic attitude toward Russia would find it difficult to become, a satellite of the U.S.S.R. It is unrealistic for us, however, to forget the fact that, no matter what government may be in power in Warsaw, it would have to lean heavily on Russia for security against the possible resurgence of Germany. The United States still has a very good chance to establish friendly relations with Poland, which needs our machinery and manufactured goods and appreciates the aid given by UNRRA and American relief organizations, but we shall not accomplish this aim merely by adopting a negative attitude of resentment against the Communists, Socialists and dissident Peasants who compose the present government. VERA MICHELES DEAN

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
International Trade: Cooperative or Competitive, compiled by Clarence A. Peters. New York, H. W. Wilson, 1946. \$1.25

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# Washington News Letter



#### WILL G.O.P. CONTINUE BIPARTISAN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY?

Recent foreign policy statements by Republican leaders confront the Democratic administration with the problem of determining anew the nature of its obligation toward its political rivals in the formulation of "bipartisan" policy. Since the statements reveal that the two parties differ about certain fundamental issues in international relations, President Truman and his new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, must decide which of three courses to take: accept the Republican point of view; reject it; or search for a compromise with the Republicans. The advantages of bipartisanship were re-emphasized last year, when Democrats and Republicans, acting in concert, successfully concluded negotiations over treaties with Germany's wartime European allies. But conditions have changed since 1946. The Republicans, then the minority party in Congress, now control Congress. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who arrived at a practical method of working with the Republicans, has been replaced by Marshall.

REPUBLICAN TENDENCIES. The goal of American policy as now conceived and practiced is to keep the world as a unit and at the same time to move away from the possibility of war. Indications that Republicans, on the contrary, are thinking in terms of a divided world came in addresses by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to the Cleveland Council of World Affairs on January 11, and by John Foster Dulles to the National Publishers' Association in New York City on January 17. Referring specifically to Latin America and China, Senator Vandenberg suggested that, in order to hold back the advance of Communism, we support, or at least accept, governments which have so far been undemocratic by our standards. Proposing that Germany be federalized, Mr. Dulles advocated that the industrial potential of western Germany be integrated with the economy of Western Europe. By its emphasis on the "economic unification" of the western countries, Mr. Dulles's proposal might encourage the division of Europe into eastern, or Russian, and western, non-Russian zones.

The makers of United States policy have hitherto believed that such modifications as Republicans now propose could improve, not harm, the position of the Soviet Union in world affairs. Democratic policy-makers in the Administration examine every issue in terms of its probable effect on the Russian-American power balance. At the same time American diplomacy rests on the assumption that we can improve our relative position in the struggle for power with-

out letting our relations with Russia degenerate into conflict and without breaking up the globe into a number of political compartments.

This is the unifying element in a policy which at first glance seems riddled by contradictions. To keep the way open to understanding with Russia, the United States last autumn discouraged the drive to remove the veto (except for atomic energy questions) from the United Nations Charter, partly because it feared that Russia would withdraw from a vetoless UN. The United States has refused to give its complete support in China to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek because it believed that such action might in time divide China into Russian and American portions, to the advantage of Russia. Washington's policy has assumed that to turn to Chiang at the expense of the Communists would not halt the Chinese civil war but would cause Russia to intervene in China-if not to counter us, then to restore tranquillity along the Russo-Chinese border. In its Latin American relations, the United States has assumed that we would foster the spread of Communism if we relied on authoritarian governments like that of Perón to combat Communist ideas. The Administration has consequently opposed the convening of a special inter-American conference that would include Argentina so long as Perón has not fulfilled his promises to rid the country of Nazi influences. Senator Vandenberg, however, said at Cleveland that "it is past time to hold the conference," which he implied, would halt the "communistic upsurge" that was "moving in."

REPUBLICAN ATTITUDE. While Senator Vandenberg certainly will try to impress on Secretary of State Marshall the wisdom of the policies he and Mr. Dulles have proposed for Germany, China and Latin America, it is unlikely that the Republicans associated with the development of bipartisanship will destroy it if Marshall and Truman reject some or all of the suggestions. Vandenberg himself on January 19 said bipartisanship had come to stay. He has learned from foreign representatives that this country increases its influence abroad in proportion to the evidence it can give that its policies are stable and continuous. Bipartisanship has also enabled Republicans justly to take credit for the foreign policy accomplishments of a Democratic administration. If, however, Washington's foreign policy at a later date should strike the public as ineffectual, the Republicans may decide that it is politically advantageous to dissociate themselves from it.

BLAIR BOLLES